Report to the G20 Los Cabos Summit on
Strengthening FSB Capacity, Resources and Governance
18-19 June 2012

At the G20 Cannes Summit (November 2011), the Heads of State and Government of the Group of Twenty agreed to strengthen the FSB’s capacity, resources and governance, including its establishment on an enduring organisation footing, strengthening its coordination role vis-à-vis other standard-setting bodies on policy development and implementation monitoring, and reconstitution of the FSB’s Steering Committee. The Leaders also called for a review of implementation of the reform at the next Summit. This report presents the progress made and seeks Leaders’ endorsement of the FSB’s recommendations for achieving the reforms as mandated by the Cannes Summit.

To address the mandate of the Cannes Summit, a High-Level Working Group (WG) on FSB Capacity, Resources and Governance (WG) was tasked with identifying and evaluating possible options and making recommendations for strengthening the FSB’s capacity, resources and governance. The FSB Plenary adopted the following recommendations, which seek to preserve its existing strengths as it acquires a more enduring organisational footing, to foster coordination and effective collaboration with its various member institutions, while drawing on their expertise and capacity to maximise synergies, with due regard to their governance and accountability arrangements. The FSB has also amended and restated its original Charter of September 2009, reflecting these recommendations.

The FSB seeks Leaders’ endorsement of these recommendations and the attached revised Charter:

I. FSB’s current and future role, and governance matters

NEED TO PRESERVE THE EXISTING STRENGTHS

1. The FSB should remain a flexible, responsive, member-driven, multi-institutional and disciplinary institution; it should also continue to operate with active involvement of senior-level officials in a collegial spirit of mutual trust, and its decision making on policy issues should continue to be based on consensus.

\[1\] The recommendations and the amended charter are still subject to endorsement by the governing bodies of the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD under their respective legal, policy and governance frameworks.
ACCOUNTABILITY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE G20

2. To maintain the effectiveness of the FSB in discharging its mandate, the FSB should preserve the nexus between the political level and regulatory policy making through regularised mechanisms of accountability to its various stakeholders, including the G20.

NEED TO REINFORCE CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE MANDATE

A strengthened, continuous and visible role
3. The FSB should strengthen its continuing role in reducing the likelihood of financial crises through vulnerability assessments, effective and forward-looking coordination of international standard setting, reviewing regulatory policy within a macroprudential perspective, and comprehensive monitoring of members’ implementation of international financial standards and agreed G20 and FSB commitments and recommendations.

Role in standard setting
4. The FSB should, as needed to address regulatory gaps that pose risk to financial stability, develop or coordinate development of standards and principles, in collaboration with the relevant standard-setting bodies and other stakeholders, as warranted, in areas which do not fall within the functional domain of another international standard-setting body, or on issues that have cross-sectoral implications, in line with the current practice.

Enhancing implementation monitoring capacity
5. The FSB’s role in promoting members’ implementation of agreed commitments, standards and policy recommendations made in the G20, FSB or the international standard setting bodies through monitoring of implementation, peer review and disclosure should continue to be enhanced, in collaboration with the SSBs and the IMF and the World Bank. The monitoring mechanisms and processes deployed to this end should be subject to a periodic structured review process with a view to strengthening them over time.

Relationship with the institutional members
6. The FSB and its institutional members and bodies should continue to draw upon their respective comparative advantages and strengths in an on-going process of collaboration intended to extract maximum synergies and complementarities.

Transparency, consultation and communication
7. The FSB should adopt a structured mechanism for public consultation on FSB policy proposals; it should also engage in dialogue with market participants and other stakeholders, including through round-tables, hearings and other appropriate events.

8. The FSB’s Regional Consultative Groups and their role in providing a structured consultative mechanism that enables non-FSB members to provide input into the policy formulation process should be appropriately reflected within the FSB Charter as a component of the FSB structure.
9. The appointment processes for all positions within the FSB should be open and transparent, also providing for an explicit term for each of the positions.

10. To improve public communication, the FSB should issue suitably detailed press releases following Plenary meetings and separate press statements on important policy decisions, as and when taken. The FSB website should also be modernised and revamped to make it more efficient and user-friendly.

II. Sound permanent institutional footing and funding basis for the FSB

SOUND PERMANENT INSTITUTIONAL FOOTING

11. The FSB considers a treaty-based inter-governmental organisation not to be an appropriate legal form at this juncture.

12. For vesting the FSB with a legal personality, creating an association under Swiss law would be an appropriate option. Appropriate Articles of Association should be formulated for this purpose, the draft of which is under review that will recognise that policy making activities will continue to be governed by the Charter.

OPTIONS FOR CONFERRING IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES ON THE LEGAL-FORM FSB

13. The FSB should adopt a gradual approach towards its institutionalisation and, at this stage obtain the needed immunities by operating as an association under the BIS Headquarters Agreement. However, the FSB should evaluate towards the end of a period of five years, in light of experience and needs at that time, whether to vest the FSB with specific immunities and privileges by negotiating a separate HQA with Swiss authorities or go beyond this.

III. Resources and financial autonomy

14. The FSB should not introduce a membership fee at this stage for augmenting the resource pool of the FSB. Instead, it should continue to rely on the BIS for its entire funding as well as other support-service needs, through an appropriate agreement with the BIS. On the expiration of the service agreement, the FSB could, however, consider introduction of a membership fee.

15. Once established as an association under Swiss law, the FSB should conclude a multiyear service agreement with the BIS that regulates the provision of financial and service support by the BIS, to provide continuity and greater planning certainty both for the FSB and the BIS.

16. The FSB and the BIS have agreed to develop a multi-year service agreement, which will be finalised in the course of implementation of the recommendation.

IV. Arrangements for financial governance
17. To ensure effective financial governance of the FSB, the FSB should constitute a
Standing Committee on Budget and Resources (SCBR) under its Charter. The SCBR
would primarily serve as a mechanism for providing the FSB autonomy in use of its
resources. The SCBR should be appropriately mandated by the FSB Plenary.

V. Amendments to the FSB Charter

18. To reflect these proposed changes in the FSB’s institutional and governance
arrangements, the FSB has amended and restated its original Charter as attached, which it
recommends for endorsement by the G20.

VI. Rules of Procedure

19. The FSB has agreed to formulate for adoption Rules of Procedure to improve its
internal governance and transparency and to bring about an element of standardization in
its internal processes.

Reconstitution of the FSB’s Steering Committee

The FSB’s Steering Committee was reconstituted in January 2012, re-balancing its
membership in terms of institutional and geographic representation leading to an
expansion in its size. In tune with the mandate of the Cannes Summit, the reconstituted
Steering Committee now has representation from the executive branch of governments of
“G20 Troika” countries, of the five countries with the largest overall systemic-importance
ranking of their financial sectors, as assessed by the IMF as well as the geographic
regions and financial centres that were not previously represented in the Committee. The
recomposition has led to an increase of 11 seats on the Committee.

Annex: Revised Charter of the FSB

Comment [jmg14]: Again, only G20 members
Argentina, Indonesia and Turkey are not on the
Steering Committee.
Revised Charter of the Financial Stability Board

Having regard to:

(1) the initial mandate given to the Financial Stability Forum by the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the Group of Seven (20 February 1999);

(2) the broadened mandate given by the Heads of State and Government of the Group of Twenty (London Summit, 2 April 2009, “Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System”);

(3) the call of the Heads of State and Government of the Group of Twenty to re-establish the Financial Stability Board “with a stronger institutional basis and enhanced capacity” (London Summit, 2 April 2009, “Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System”);

(4) the Financial Stability Board Charter of 25 September 2009 and the endorsement by the Heads of State and Government of the Group of Twenty of the institutional strengthening of the FSB through its Charter (Pittsburgh Summit, 25 September 2009);

(5) the affirmation by the Heads of State and Government of the Group of Twenty of the FSB’s role in coordinating at the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies in developing and promoting the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies in the interest of global financial stability (Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration, 12 November 2010); and

(6) the call of the Heads of State and Government of the Group of Twenty to strengthen FSB’s capacity, resources and governance through establishment of the FSB on an enduring organisational basis (Cannes Summit, 4 November 2011, Cannes Summit Final Declaration);

Recognising the need to promote financial stability by developing strong regulatory, supervisory and other financial-sector policies, and fostering a level playing field through coherent policy implementation across sectors and jurisdictions;

We, the Members of the Financial Stability Board hereby amend and restate the original Charter of 25 September 2009 in the following manner:

Comment [jmg15]: The New Rules-Brooking High Level Panel on FSB Governance was release in September 2011.
I. General provisions

Article 1. Objectives of the Financial Stability Board

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is established to coordinate at the international level the work of national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies (SSBs) in order to develop and promote the implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies. In collaboration with the international financial institutions, the FSB will address vulnerabilities affecting financial systems in the interest of global financial stability.

Article 2. Mandate and tasks of the FSB

(1) As part of its mandate, the FSB will:

(a) assess vulnerabilities affecting the global financial system and identify and review on a timely and ongoing basis within a macroprudential perspective, the regulatory, supervisory and related actions needed to address them, and their outcomes;

(b) promote coordination and information exchange among authorities responsible for financial stability;

(c) monitor and advise on market developments and their implications for regulatory policy;

(d) advise on and monitor best practice in meeting regulatory standards;

(e) undertake joint strategic reviews of and coordinate the policy development work of the international standard setting bodies to ensure their work is timely, coordinated, focused on priorities and addressing gaps;

(f) set guidelines for and support the establishment of supervisory colleges;

(g) support contingency planning for cross-border crisis management, particularly with respect to systemically important firms;

(h) collaborate with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to conduct Early Warning Exercises;

(i) promote member jurisdictions’ implementation of agreed commitments, standards and policy recommendations through monitoring of implementation, peer review and disclosure; and

(j) undertake any other tasks agreed by its Members in the course of its activities and within the framework of this Charter.
(2) The FSB will promote and help coordinate the alignment of the activities of the SSBs to address any overlaps or gaps and clarify demarcations in light of changes in national and regional regulatory structures relating to prudential and systemic risk, market integrity and investor and consumer protection, infrastructure, as well as accounting and auditing.

(3) The FSB should, as needed to address regulatory gaps that pose risk to financial stability, develop or coordinate development of standards and principles, in collaboration with the SSBs and others, as warranted, in areas which do not fall within the functional domain of another international standard setting body, or on issues that have cross-sectoral implications.

Article 3. Consultation

(1) In the development of the FSB’s medium- and long-term strategic plans, principles, standards and guidance, the FSB should consult widely amongst its Members and with other stakeholders including private sector and non-member authorities. This process shall include engaging with the FSB Regional Consultative Groups and include an outreach to countries not included in the Regional Consultative Groups.

(2) The FSB should have a structured process for public consultation on policy proposals.

Article 4. Accountability and transparency

The FSB will discharge its accountability, beyond its members, through publication of reports and, in particular, through periodical reporting of progress in its work to the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the Group of Twenty, and to Heads of State and Governments of the Group of Twenty.

II. Members

Article 5. Members

(1) The following are eligible to be a Member:

(a) Authorities from jurisdictions responsible for maintaining financial stability, such as ministries of finance, central banks, and supervisory and regulatory authorities;

(b) International financial institutions; and

(c) International standard setting, regulatory, supervisory and central bank bodies.

(2) The eligibility of Members will be reviewed periodically by the Plenary in the light of the FSB objectives.
(3) Current Members of the FSB are listed in Annex A.

**Article 6. Commitments of Members**

(1) Member jurisdictions commit to:

- (a) pursue the maintenance of financial stability;
- (b) maintain the openness and transparency of the financial sector;
- (c) implement international financial standards; and
- (d) undergo periodic peer reviews, using among other evidence IMF/World Bank public Financial Sector Assessment Program reports
- (e) take part in implementation monitoring of agreed commitments, standards and policy recommendations.

(2) The FSB will periodically report on the degree of adherence by the Members to these commitments and the evaluation process.

(3) In support of the mandate and tasks laid down in Article 2 (1) (e), the standard setting bodies will report to the FSB on their work without prejudice to their existing reporting arrangements or their independence. This process should not undermine the independence of the standard setting process but strengthen support for strong standard setting by providing a broader accountability framework.

(4) The international financial institutions participate as Members in the FSB in accordance with their respective legal frameworks and policies.

### III. Organisation

**Article 7. Structure**

The organisational structure of the FSB consists of the following:

(1) the Plenary;

(2) the Steering Committee;

(3) standing Committees;

(4) Working Groups;

(5) the Regional Consultative Groups;

(6) the Chair; and

**Comment [jmg25]:** This comment seems oxymoron: the Financial Sector defines closed and non-transparent.

**Comment [jmg26]:** New to Revised Charter. New Rules welcomes the emphasis on implementation.

**Comment [jmg27]:** New to the Revised Charter.
(7) the Secretariat.

**Article 8. Appointment processes**

Appointment processes should be open and transparent for all positions within the FSB.

**The Plenary**

**Article 9. Responsibilities of the Plenary**

(1) The Plenary is the sole decision-making body of the FSB for all matters governed by this Charter.

(2) Decisions by the Plenary shall be taken by consensus.

(3) The Plenary:

(a) decides on the manner in which the Plenary conducts its affairs;
(b) approves the work programme and the budget of the FSB;
(c) adopts reports, principles, standards, recommendations and guidance developed by the FSB;
(d) decides on Membership of the FSB;
(e) appoints the Chair;
(f) appoints the chairs of the Standing Committees and the Secretary General at the proposal of the FSB Chair;
(g) establishes Standing Committees and working groups, as necessary, and gives them their mandates;
(h) endorses the mandates of the working groups set up by the FSB Steering and Standing Committees;
(i) decides on any amendments to this Charter; and
(j) decides on any other matter governing the business and affairs of the FSB.

**Article 10. Representation and attendance**

(1) Representation at the Plenary shall be at the level of central bank governor or immediate deputy; head or immediate deputy of the main supervisory/regulatory agency; and deputy finance minister or deputy head of finance ministry. Plenary representatives also include the chairs of the main SSBs and committees of central bank experts, and high-level representatives of the IMF, the World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

(2) All Members shall be entitled to attend the Plenary Meetings. The Chair shall preside over the Plenary Meetings.

(3) The Chair can extend, after consultation with Members, ad-hoc invitations to representatives of non-FSB Members to attend the whole or part of the Plenary Meetings.
In the context of specific sessions of the Plenary, the Chair can also invite, after consultation with Members, representatives of the private sector.

**Article 11. Seat assignments**

The number of seats in the Plenary assigned to Member jurisdictions reflects the size of the national economy, financial market activity and national financial stability arrangements of the corresponding Member jurisdiction.

The seat assignments shall be periodically reviewed in accordance with the above criteria.

**Steering Committee**

**Article 12. Responsibilities of the Steering Committee**

(1) The Steering Committee shall provide operational guidance between the Plenary meetings to carry forward the directions of the FSB and prepare the Plenary Meetings in order to allow the Plenary to efficiently fulfill its mandate.

(2) The Steering Committee may establish working groups as needed which may include representatives of non-FSB members.

(3) The duties of the Steering Committee include the following:

   (a) monitor and guide the progress of FSB’s ongoing work;
   (b) promote coordination across and commission work from the Standing Committees and other working groups;
   (c) ensure effective information flow to all Members;
   (d) coordinate and conduct, jointly with the relevant SSBs, reviews of the policy development work of the international SSBs, including with regard to regulatory gaps that pose risk to financial stability;
   (e) prepare options for decision of the Plenary; and
   (f) take forward, after consultation and consistent with the directions of the Plenary, any other work necessary for the FSB to fulfill its mandate.

**Article 13. Composition and appointment**

(1) The composition of the Steering Committee is decided by the Plenary at the proposal of the Chair in a manner that ensures maximum effectiveness in taking forward the FSB’s work while having regard to balanced representation in terms of geographic regions and institutional functions.

(2) The composition of the Steering Committee shall be reviewed periodically in accordance with the criteria set out in the previous section.

**Standing Committees**
Article 14. Standing Committee on Assessment of Vulnerabilities (SCAV)

The SCAV’s functions are to:

(1) monitor and assess vulnerabilities affecting the global financial system and propose to the Plenary actions needed to address them;

(2) monitor and advise on market and systemic developments, and their implications for regulatory policy; and

(3) provide input for the Early Warning Exercise conducted in collaboration with the IMF.

Article 15. Standing Committee on Supervisory and Regulatory Cooperation (SCSRC)

The SCSRC’s functions are to:

(1) address key financial stability issues relating to the development of supervisory and regulatory policy, identify relative priorities, and seek to ensure that the different policy initiatives fit together into a coherent whole;

(2) assist in managing the coordination issues that arise among supervisors and regulators on issues that have cross-sector implications and raise any need for policy development required to close regulatory gaps that pose risk to financial stability;

(3) set guidelines for and oversee the establishment and effective functioning of supervisory colleges; and

(4) advise on and monitor best practice in meeting regulatory standards with a view to ensure consistency, cooperation and a level playing field across jurisdictions.

Article 16. Standing Committee on Standards Implementation (SCSI)

The SCSI’s functions are to:

(1) ensure comprehensive and rigorous implementation monitoring of international financial standards, agreed G20 and FSB commitments, recommendations and other initiatives in consultation and coordination with other relevant bodies, through mechanisms such as the Coordination Framework for Implementation Monitoring (CFIM);

(2) undertake peer reviews amongst its members;
(3) report to the Plenary on members’ commitments and progress in implementing international financial standards, agreed G20 and FSB commitments, recommendations and other initiatives; and

(4) encourage global adherence to prudential regulatory and supervisory standards, such as through the FSB’s Framework for Strengthening Adherence to International Standards.

**Article 17. Standing Committee on Budget and Resources (SCBR)**

The SCBR’s functions are to:

(1) provide the Plenary with assessments of the resource needs of the Secretariat taking into account the current mandate, the work programme and emerging demands;

(2) review a medium-term budget and resource framework as well as annual resource budget for the FSB Secretariat, with due regard to cost control, for approval by the Plenary;

(3) identify, evaluate and recommend to the Plenary options for independent raising of resources by the FSB, over the medium term, to supplement the funding received from the BIS;

(4) ensure, through appropriate arrangements, necessary transparency in the matters of financial governance of the FSB so as to be able to withstand public scrutiny.

**Article 18. Chairs and composition**

(1) The chairs of the Standing Committees are selected from and appointed by the Plenary at the Chair’s recommendation for terms of two years renewable once. They report to the Plenary on their work programs.

(2) Membership in Standing Committees is decided by the Plenary on the proposal of FSB Chair, drawn up in consultation with the chair of the Standing Committee with due regard to the effectiveness, balanced representation and the mandate of the respective Standing Committee. Membership is normally drawn from the designated representatives on the Plenary.

(3) A Member authority can, in consultation with the Chair, decide whether its representation in a Standing Committee is through another authority or agency of the Member jurisdiction that is not a designated FSB Member.

(4) The chairs of Standing Committees can extend ad-hoc invitations to non-members to attend the whole or part of their meetings.

**Article 19. Setting up of working groups**

Comment [jmg36]: New Rules salutes the FSB for this language. There must be adequate mechanisms for the public to scrutinize before a policy is recommended as well as provide feedback on its impact for the real economy.

Comment [jmg37]: New Rules heartily endorses this item. We interpret this broadly to refer to any country, not just FSB non-members.
Standing Committees may establish working groups as needed which may include representatives of non-FSB members.

**Regional Consultative Groups (RCGs)**

**Article 20. Regional Consultative Groups**

(1) The FSB Regional Consultative Groups provide a structured mechanism for:

- (a) interaction of FSB members with non-members regarding the various FSB initiatives underway and planned;
- (b) promoting implementation within the region of international financial policy initiatives; and
- (c) the regional group members to share amongst themselves and with the FSB their views on vulnerabilities affecting the financial system, on FSB initiatives and on other measures that could be taken to promote financial stability.

(2) The current Regional Consultative Groups are listed in Annex B.

**Chair**

**Article 21. Appointment and Responsibilities**

(1) The Chair is selected from representatives on the Plenary and appointed by the Plenary for a term of three years renewable once.

(2) The Chair should have recognised expertise and standing in the international financial policy arena.

(3) The Chair convenes and chairs the meetings of the Plenary and of the Steering Committee. The Chair oversees the Secretariat.

(4) The Chair is the principal spokesperson for the FSB and represents the FSB externally. The Chair should be informed of all significant matters that concern the FSB.

(5) More generally, the Chair will take all decisions and act as necessary to achieve the objectives of the FSB in accordance with the directions given by the Plenary.

(6) The Chair, in the discharge of the functions as the Chair, shall owe duty entirely to the FSB and the FSB membership and to no other authorities or institutions.

**Secretariat**

**Article 22. Secretariat**

(1) The Secretariat shall be directed by the Secretary General.
(2) The Secretary General shall be appointed by the Plenary at the proposal of the Chair for a term of five years renewable.

(3) The Secretary General shall be under the responsibility, and shall act in accordance with the instructions, of the Chair. The Chair shall be responsible for providing general direction to the Secretary General, in accordance with any directions given by the Plenary.

(4) Secretariat staff shall be selected by the Secretary General following an appropriate recruitment and evaluation process.

(5) In appointing the Secretariat staff, the Secretary General shall, subject to the importance of securing the highest standards of efficiency and of technical competence and expertise in financial stability and regulatory policy areas, pay due regard to the importance of a balanced composition in terms of geographic regions and institutional functions, and of retaining institutional memory by having an adequate proportion of staff on open-ended contracts.

(6) The Secretary General and the Secretariat staff in the discharge of their functions should owe their duty entirely to the FSB and to no other authorities or institutions.

(7) The main responsibilities of the Secretariat include the following:

(a) to support the activities of the FSB, including its Committees, Regional Consultative Groups and working groups;
(b) to facilitate cooperation amongst the Members and between the FSB and other institutions;
(c) to ensure efficient communication to Members and others;
(d) to manage efficiently the financial, material and human resources allocated to the FSB (including the selection of staff who may be seconded by Members);
(e) to maintain the records, administer the website and deal with the correspondence of the FSB; and
(f) to carry out all other functions that are assigned by the Chair or the Plenary.

(8) The Secretariat shall be located in Basel at the BIS.

IV. Final provisions

Article 23. Legal Effect

This Charter is not intended to create any legal rights or obligations.

Article 24. Effective date

This Charter shall come into effect on 19 June 2012.
Annex A

List of FSB Members

A. Member Jurisdictions

Argentina
· Central Bank of Argentina
Australia
· Department of the Treasury
· Reserve Bank of Australia
Brazil
· Ministry of Finance
· Central Bank of Brazil
· Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil
Canada
· Department of Finance
· Bank of Canada
· Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI)
China
· Ministry of Finance
· People’s Bank of China
· China Banking Regulatory Commission
France
· Ministry of Economy, Finance and Foreign Trade
· Bank of France
· Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF)
Germany
· Ministry of Finance
· Deutsche Bundesbank
· Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Bafin)
Hong Kong SAR
· Hong Kong Monetary Authority
India
· Ministry of Finance
· Reserve Bank of India
· Securities and Exchange Board of India
Indonesia
· Bank Indonesia
Italy
· Ministry of the Economy and Finance
· Bank of Italy
· Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB)
Japan
· Ministry of Finance
· Bank of Japan
· Financial Services Agency

Korea
· Bank of Korea
· Financial Services Commission

Mexico
· Ministry of Finance and Public Credit
· Bank of Mexico

Netherlands
· Ministry of Finance
· Netherlands Bank

Russia
· Ministry of Finance
· Central Bank of the Russian Federation
· Federal Financial Markets Service

Saudi Arabia
· Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency

Singapore
· Monetary Authority of Singapore

South Africa
· Ministry of Finance

Spain
· Ministry of Economy and Finance
· Bank of Spain

Switzerland
· Swiss Federal Department of Finance
· Swiss National Bank

Turkey
· Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey

United Kingdom
· HM Treasury
· Bank of England
· Financial Services Authority

United States
· Department of the Treasury
· Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
· Securities and Exchange Commission

European Union
· European Central Bank
· European Commission

B. International Financial Institutions
· Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
· International Monetary Fund (IMF)
· Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
· World Bank

C. International Standard-Setting, Regulatory, Supervisory and Central Bank Bodies
· Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
· Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS)
· Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS)
· International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
· International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)
· International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
Annex B

List of the FSB Regional Consultative Groups

(1) FSB Regional Consultative Group for the Americas
(2) FSB Regional Consultative Group for Asia
(3) FSB Regional Consultative Group for the Commonwealth of Independent States
(4) FSB Regional Consultative Group for Europe
(5) FSB Regional Consultative Group for the Middle East and North Africa
(6) FSB Regional Consultative Group for the Sub-Saharan Africa